

# Christianity and Postmodernism Part 1

## By Dr. J.P. Moreland

Announcer:

This is the second year of the philosophy and Ethics series that Talbot, which is designed to focus on issues which are relevant to Christian thought, behavior, ethics, and culture viewed from a biblical and philosophical perspective. Our series was inaugurated last year by Dr. Doug Geivett, and this year it's our privilege to feature Dr. J.P. Moreland, professor of philosophy at Talbot. Today, he brings us part one of a series which will conclude next week entitled Postmodernism and Christianity. Dr. Moreland holds the MA degree from UC Riverside, the THM degree from Dallas Seminary, and the PhD in philosophy from the University of Southern California, which at least for the moment, has a better record in football than UCLA.

[Audience laughs]

Announcer:

Of course, UCLA hasn't played their first game yet.

[Audience laughs]

Announcer:

J.P. is a prolific author. Among his many books are Christianity and the Nature of Science, Scaling the Secular City, Does God Exist, Immortality: The Other Side of Death, co-authored with Garry Habermas, Jesus Under Fire, co-edited with Dr. Mike Wilkins, and most recently Love Your God With All Your Mind. Dr. Moreland addresses several conferences each year across the nation. He has spoken on over 100 college campuses. He served for 10 years with

Campus Crusade for Christ and has planted and pastored two churches. Dr. Moreland lives in Yorba Linda with his wife Hope and his two children, Ashley, age 18, and Allison, age 16. J.P. is a dear colleague, uh, he is passionate for the cause of Christ and for winning souls. So we're very glad to have him speak to us this morning. We want--

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Speaker 1:

Let us unite our hearts in prayer together. Bless the Lord, oh, my soul, and all that is within me. Bless His holy name. Father, we do bless You and thank You for the great salvation that we have through faith in our Lord Jesus Christ, and especially here at Talbot we want to praise You for Your mercy and faithfulness in putting us in the ministry. For bringing us together to teach and train together here at Talbot. We ask you to make this day a day when we will especially experience empowerment of Your Holy Spirit and direction from Your Word. We thank You today for Dr. Moreland, the tremendous impact of his ministry by spoken word, by written page. And the passion that he has to declare Your truth, Father. And to see lives changed. We pray especially that You will help him today as he explores the impact of postmodernism on our schools, our churches, our faith. Give him special insight to help us to properly evaluate this movement, to know how, as Christians, we should respond to it. Well, Father, make these lessons these lectures life transforming so that we may be better prepared to serve our Lord Jesus Christ, who is the truth and whose word is truth. Amen.

[Silence]

J.P. Moreland:

Good morning, I'd like to thank my dear brother Dennis Gaines for inviting me to have the privilege of sharing with you uh, this morning and next week. Uh one of the great joys of my whole life, I'm 50 years old and have been in the ministry since 1968, and one of the great joys of my life has been to be a part of the faculty of Talbot's School of Theology. And I think those of us at Talbot's have a deep and abiding sense, not only of joy in each other's presence, but a deep sense that our best days are still ahead and that there is exciting movement that is taking place uh in our midst. Then we are privileged to be at Biola University as well. Now, those of us in the ministry and those of us who are called to serve Jesus Christ and to honor Him, to spread the gospel, and to disciple believers, have both a privilege and a responsibility of understanding the culture in which we're called to live and move and have our being. There is much about culture at any particular period of time that is positive, and can be warmly embraced by a believing community. There are other aspects of culture that need to be severely critiqued and largely rejected. And then there are all manner of gradations in between.

This morning and next Tuesday, I would like to try to give you an understanding of a cultural phenomenon called postmodernism. And I will be uh trying to define and describe postmodernism to the degree that that's possible this morning. And I will be offering critique of postmodernism next time. Now, my evaluation of postmodernism is largely negative, but I want to be careful that I say something from the very beginning uh before I uh deal with a basically negative response to postmodernism as a set of ideas. Now, what I want to say is this: postmodernism is very much like existentialism. It is almost impossible to define because postmodernism, like existentialism, is against, among other things, definitions. And so it becomes difficult to say what postmodernism is in all of its incarnations. Now, the result of that

is, then, that there may be things about certain postmodernists that are positive and quite worth keeping and evaluating. I know, for example, that we have professors here at Biola that do a very good job of teaching postmodernism, of evaluating it, and of calling students' attentions to some of the benefits of postmodernism.

For example, Postmodernists have reminded us of the importance of power dynamics that lie uh often behind language. Many times the selection of words that we use uh-uh is in fact rooted in a desire to gain power over another group or another individual. So I think it's a worthy object of study. There is- there are some things in postmodernism, and depending on the person in question, that will be positive, I must say, on the other hand, and I'm willing to be wrong on this. I'm not dogmatic on this point. But I have yet to see a single benefit of postmodernism to the Christian church that cannot be gained without accepting postmodernism. Or to say it differently, the supposed advantages of postmodernism, I believe, can be gathered by reading Aristotle and Plato in the medievals and people during the Enlightenment period, and I don't know of any single advantage that comes from being a postmodernist that can't be gained with equal force without having to accept postmodernism.

Well, that's a brief introduction as to where I'm headed. And what I would like to do now is to begin to just introduce postmodernism to you, and then that will he-uh require us to go into a bit more depth. By way of overview, uh the term Postmodernism can mean one of two things. First of all, it can be a chronological label for a historical period. It can be a chronological label for a period of time. What period of time? The time after modernity. After modernism. So, that would require us then to try to identify the period of modernity which most people would-would

identify as having taken place during the Enlightenment in Europe. Let's say the 17th and 18th centuries, it's always hard to draw lines around these things. And I think many postmodernists would argue that the spirit of modernity carried into this period, and that postmodernity began around the middle of the century, I would-it's hard to define uh cut off points. But I would say probably that-that uh postmodernity as a cultural movement began in the late 50s and the early 60s, at least in this country. So postmodernism can then simply be a marker for a period of time after the Enlightenment and after modernity. And as such, it usually refers to a cultural posture that began, I would say, in the late 50s, in the early 60s in the United States.

More importantly, postmodernism is a philosophical position. It is not a position primarily in literature, it is a philosophical position. And as such, it is primarily a reinterpretation of what knowledge is. In its essence, postmodernism is a view of knowledge. Now, this is going to then uh require us to get into some issues about uh modernism and so on. But the thing I want to say is that postmodernism, in its essence, is an epistemology, a theory of knowledge, and it includes a metaphysics and a philosophy of language. It includes a theory of what's real, and it includes a theory of language and how language works. What about Deconstructionism? This is still by way of introduction. Deconstructionism is something postmodernists due to chunks of language. Um a-a a deconstruction would be something--would be the application of postmodernist ideas to a unit of language, perhaps a literary text, perhaps verbal uh or nonverbal communication.

I once was in a meeting when a uh a friend of mine, got up to address a group and uh, a particular individual in that meeting uh interrupted my friend and said, "I am offended by the fact that you stood up and looked at us to address us, because the reason that you got up was in order

to gain power over the audience and to gain a sense of talk-down to them." Now, that was a form of deconstructing the non-verbal communication of my friend, who basically got up simply so that people wouldn't be looking at the back of his head, and in order to put his notes on the podium and to address people as-is-as an audience.

[Audience laughs]

J.P. Moreland:

In deconstruction, you either deny that-that a text has an authorial intention, you either deny that there is an author's intended meaning in a text, or you just set it aside and you play with the text. You bring questions to the text and play with it. You may, for example, bring feminist questions to a text, in which case you could therefore have a feminist book of Romans. Or you could bring homosexual questions, or Lutheran questions, or Catholic questions. And there would then be as many books of Romans as there were interlocutor's of uh the chun-the sense perceptible object. We can't call it a text, I guess, if it doesn't have a meaning. But it is a sense perceptible object before the uh the individual. It prob-it becomes a text as it is deconstructed on this view. So deconstruction applies then to what we do to language, either verbal or nonverbal behavior. Now, uh since I've just said that postmodernism is primarily a philosophical commitment, it is important for us now to get a hold of what it is. And I will be spending the rest of my time here this morning talking about that. If you enjoy this, then what we can do is get sleeping bags, build a bonfire upfront, get some donuts and s'mores, and we'll just spend the day talking about this and feel the love among us as we uh move into these matters.

[Audience laughs]

J.P. Moreland:

Now, in order to get clear on postmodernity, we have to get clear on modernity. And so the question can be raised: what ideas were part of modernism that postmodernists have trouble with? What ideas were true of modernism that postmodernism has difficulty with? Now, before I get into this, I want to say two caveats here, and I hope you'll listen to both of these. First of all, most of what is identified as modernist ideas can be traced back to Aristotle and Plato in the medieval period. To be specific, for example, the idea that truth is a correspondence with reality was not something that John Locke or Rene Descartes came up with. This goes clear back to Aristotle, and indeed, I think it's its implicit understanding in the Old Testament. But in any case, many of the supposed modernist ideas quite pre-date the modern period. Secondly, when I tell you now what is characteristic of modernity, it would be uh naive of me to think that everyone in the modern period held to all these ideas. Uh, John Locke and uh uh Leibniz are quite different from Kant. And yet both Kant and Locke and Leibniz would be classified as modernist according to the scheme.

So what I'm going to do is to sort of give you the received view of what modernism is, and uh it will be against the received view of modernism that postmodernism reacts. Number one, according to modernity, properly understood--now uh-uh there is one way the world really is. There is an external world, it's real, and there is one and only one external world. Sometimes this is called metaphysical realism, and the idea is that there is a difference between reality and non-reality. There is a language independent, real world Virginia, according to this. Yes, Virginia, there is a real world. What is reality? Well, for our purposes, reality is what you bump up against when your beliefs are false. Uh, reality is what you bump up against when your beliefs are false.

Now, that's not a technical definition, but that will do. For those of you who want a technical definition, reality resides in the having of properties. That is what reality is. If something has properties, it exists. If something does not exist, it has no properties. But that's a more technical definition. For our purposes, reality is just what you bump up against when you-when your beliefs are false.

So according to the modernist, there is a language, or cultural, or mind independent real world, that is quote unquote "out there." Number two, truth is correspondence with reality. According to the modernist, there-the modernist accepts a correspondence theory of truth. Uh, a very brief definition of the correspondence theory of truth would be as follows: truth is when things are the way I take them to be. Truth is when things are the way I take them to be. So if gra-if I take grass to be green and it turns out the grass is green, then my taking grass to be green is true. If grass is not green and I take it to be green, then my taking grass to be green is false. Truth is a relationship between propositions, or thoughts, and what they are about. Okay? Truth is a relationship. Like, "to the left of," if you have to the left of, you need two things: something here, something there, and one is to the left of the other. To have truth, you need a proposition or a thought, you need what it is of, and you need there to be a correspondence relation between the thought and what it is of to be true.

On this view, truth is not personal. I even-I don't know what it means to say "truth is personal," to tell you the truth. Unless it means something like truth should enhance personal relationships or something of that sort. But truth is a relationship between an idea or a thought in the external world. Now, what about absolute truth? Let me say a word about absolute truth, because there is

a tremendous amount of confusion in Christian circles about what absolute truth is. Uh, absolute truth can either be given an epistemological or a metaphysical definition. Let's define truth metaphysically, absolute truth metaphysically. When we use absolute truth metaphysically, we don't mean anything more than truth. Metaphysically, the word absolute is redundant. If something's true, it's an absolute truth. So, for example, the statement, "Kennedy was president of the United States in the early 60's" is an absolute truth. Uh, the statement that "electrons have negative charge," uh that "my daughter Ashley is a freshman at Biola," that "there are at least five craters on the back side of the moon."

Um, uh, truth in terms of the-of the genuine sense, and absolute truth is just the truth. So the label absolute is really redundant unless you're trying to use it to say there's a difference between truth and approximate truth, okay? So suppose there are two hundred and fifty people in here. Suppose. If I were to say "There are uh, two hundred forty in here," You might say, "That's approximately true," but the statement that there's two hundred and fifty people in here would be an absolute truth if that's how many people are in here now. Note carefully that on this understanding of truth, truth has nothing to do with whether I can tell something's true. Whether or not something's true or false has nothing to do with whether I'm able to verify that it is true or false. Okay? So if I were to say something like, "There are uh, um, 250 craters on the back side of the moon." Now, if that proposition is true, that means what? There are, in fact, 250 craters on the back side of the moon. Now, that I-that would be true whether I'm blind, or whether I have rocket ships, or whether I can get to the backside of the moon or whatever.

Truth on this view is not epistemological. It has nothing to do with whether I can tell something's true, or whether I can prove it's true. It has to do with whether my thought is the way things are the way I take them to be. So on that view, the word-the label absolute is kind of redundant. Now what about the epistemological sense of truth? Not-not in my meaning of this term, to say something is an absolute truth epistemologically means, "I'm 100 percent certain that it's true." Now, I think this is a mistake, and I think we ought to just stop using it this way. Because on this view, the only way you're able to say something is an absolute truth is if we're 100 percent sure it's true. If you're 80 percent sure it's true, or if you're 50/50, you're not able to say it's an absolute truth. So, for example, I will say to people, "It's an absolute truth that Jesus is the Son of God." And they'll say to me, "Are you 100 percent sure it's true?" And I'll say to them, "No, I'm probably sure it's true. It might be false. The historical evidence upon which I base that claim is probabilistic evidence. It could be the case that Jesus never rose from the dead. It could be the case that Christianity is false."

But it is an absolute truth, and I'm-I'm 80-20 on it that it's true. I'm far more sure it's true than I'm not. But what I'm-what the proposition itself is, is an absolute truth, if it's true at all. So on this view, if truth requires absolute certainty, I would not be able to say it's an absolute truth that Jesus Christ rose from the dead on my view, you understand. Why? Because I'm not 100 percent sure of it. So we wanted-we don't want to use absolute truth for something we're sure of. Why? Because if somebody can put a doubt in your claim, that means that your claim is false, right? If truth requires 100 percent certainty and all a person-and a person can provide a doubt with regard to your claim, then that means that they've shown your claim at least isn't an absolute truth. And I would want to say all they've shown is that my claim might be mistaken, they haven't shown

anything about whether it is mistaken. Metaphysical realism, there's a way the world really is. Truth is a correspondence between an idea or a thought in the external world, an absolute truth is just the truth. It doesn't mean I'm 100 percent sure about it.

Uh, number three, a thesis about language. Language can be used successfully to refer to things in the world. Language can be used successfully to refer to things in the world. When I use the term mammal or dog, I can use that term to actually pick out an object in the world out there, that's barking and wagging its tail. Now, many times language does not have a referential use, that's true. Many times we use language in a non-referential sense. For example, if I say to you, "Ouch," I'm using language to express an emotion, not to refer to anything. If I say to you, "Close the door," I'm using language to issue a command, I'm not referring to anything. If I say to you uh in front of a uh uh minister in a church uh after he asks me a certain question, "I do," I am attempting to accomplish an action, namely get married. It's called a performative utterance. It is not attempting to refer to anything, I'm doing something with words. Still, we often use language to refer to entities in the world. Now, many times-now the postmodernist idea is that the referential use of language is either false or useless. And we'll try to see why it would be false or useless uh next time.

Letter D, this is very important. Very important. The objectivity of reason. The objectivity of reason. According to the modernist, there are cross-cultural standards, there are objective standards for deciding whether a belief is true or false, rational or irrational, good or bad, right or wrong. Let me say that again. There are obj-there is an objectivity in the claim that some beliefs are true and some are false, some are rational, some are irrational, some are right, some are

wrong, some are good, some are bad, some are beautiful, some are ugly. Now, the modernist does not say that in every case you will be able to tell whether something's true or false. We all know that in many cases, deciding where the truth lies is a hard task, isn't it? But the point of the modernist is that truth, that rationality, is at least objective. It is at least objective. Now, in order to get clear on this, we need to draw a distinction between psychological objectivity and epistemological objectivity. Okay? What's our topic? Our topic is that rationality is objective. Now we want to know what that means and we need to draw a distinction between two kinds of objectivity.

The first kind of objectivity is called psychological objectivity. If you are psychologically objective, that means that you have no bias one way or another regarding a subject. To be psychologically objective is to not be biased or to not have a uh-uh-uh an opinion one way or the other, that you favor, you with me on that? Now, can we be psychologically objective? I think the answer is clearly yes, depending on the question. I remember um uh, one of my-my daughter's boyfriend making a claim about who was going to win the NHL last year. I had absolutely--I don't like hockey, I don't care about it, um I really had no--I didn't care one way or the other. I asked him, I said, "Can you tell me why you think so-and-so is going to win instead of us-and-so?" And so I was I was willing to hear his arg--if somebody had argued for the other team, I would have sat there and lis--I didn't care. I could have cared less. I had no bias one way or the other. I remember going to seminary, and a number of the subjects in seminary that I studied, I had no prior commitment to. The proper interpretation, for example, of the Book of First John was a subject about which I had no prior guess work on. I had no--I wanted to learn the issues. I was not biased one way or the other.

Are we often psychologically subjective and not objective? Yes. Many times, maybe most of the time, we are not psychologically object--I'm not psychologically objective about the existence of God, about the wrongness of abortion, or about the truth of Christianity. I'm not psychologically objective about those. When I consider those questions, it's not like I say, it's kind of a dice roll, I don't care one way or the other. I'm passionately committed to one option. Psychological objectivity. Very different from epistemological objectivity. What does it mean for there to be epistemological objectivity? It means that there are, in principle, good, justifying reasons for a belief. There are, in principle, good, justifying reasons for a belief that do not depend upon my accepting them or their status as good. There are, in principle, good reasons for a belief, that don't depend upon the fact that I accept those reasons for what makes them good. To say this differently, there are some factors when we are arguing for something that do justify a conclusion. And if you don't accept those factors, the problem is with you, not with the factors.

Let's take the O.J. Simpson case, for example. Some people might have thought certain pieces of evidence were not good evidence for the conclusion that he was guilty. But it could very well have been that certain pieces of evidence were, in fact, good evidence for the conclusion that he was guilty. Whether anybody accepted that evidence or liked that evidence at all? Right? I mean, now maybe some cases are hard to decide, but epistemological objectivity just basically means, in principle, there are objectively good reasons to justify a belief, and I want to find them as best I can. I want to do the best I can to find them. Now, does it follow that I can't be epistemologically objective if I'm psychologically subjective? Are you all still out there?

[Audience laughs]

J.P. Moreland:

From the fact that I'm biased about something, does it follow from that, that I can't have good reasons for what I believe, where those reasons are good, the goodness of those reasons doesn't depend on simply the fact they're mine. Hmm? Well, many people seem to think so, and I believe we'll see next time, I believe a number of postmodernists have argued that people aren't objective and therefore rationality is subjective. And I believe that this argument rests on a confusion between the two kinds of objectivity. It does not follow from the fact that I'm biased, that I can't find objectively good reasons for something. Right? If that were the case, if no one could offer good reasons for anything if they accepted it, the only thing university professors could teach would be things they don't believe. That's a little tough for me to choke down. It has the implication that those who accept postmodernism could never teach it to anyone. You'd all have to teach enlightenment epistemology, and that would be pretty tough for them to choke down. So um, I do think that there is a problem here, and um I do think that the key issue is not in my psychology, the key issue is the case itself and whether the reasons for the conclusion are good reasons or not.

And if you think they're bad reasons, you bring your case. Okay? You make your case, but you can't just start by saying it's pointless for any of us to make a case because we're all biased before we talk. If that were the case, then that utterance itself would be somewhat pointless and it would turn out to be sort of a self-refuting kind of a claim. Now, um, I want to, I want to say uh three other things quickly, and this will probably bring us uh to a close today. Um, the modernists were highly individualistic regarding the self. They were highly individualistic regarding the self. You-you find uh that the concept of the Western individual ego, or the bounded atomistic view

of the person, where a person is a self-contained, isolated self. I do think that this is a problem with modernity. I think it's understandable, and as a Christian, by the way, I'm going to let the chips fall where they are. When modernity's wrong, they're wrong. I don't care whether modernity or postmodernity is right. I want to know what the truth is as best I can.

And the point I'm making now is, that it's understandable, given the history of Europe, why so much fuss was being made at the time of Locke and others who were writing, let's say, social contract theory. It's pretty obvious why they wanted to emphasize the importance and autonomy of the individual, given the incredible enslavement to uh centuries of-of finding your place in society and playing it. That's understandable. Still, it is true, I think, that the modernist went too far and failed to emphasize the importance of community. I do think that's true. And so I do think it is appropriate to fault modernity for its inordinate individualism. I think that's a good point.

Two other things, um-uh, that are a part of modernism. Uh-the first of the two is called foundationalism. This is awfully hard to define, foundationalism. I'm going to give a bad definition and Dr. Geivett will probably fuss at me for two or three days about this, because he's an expert on this. So don't be mad at me, Doug, if I give a bad definition here.

But basically, foundationalism is the idea that some beliefs are justified by other beliefs. That is, we hold some beliefs because we hold others, and these justify this. And ultimately, you reach beliefs that we have that are not justified by other beliefs. These are sort of self-evident, let's say. Then you reach some beliefs that are sort of intrinsically justified, let's say. That aren't justified because of other beliefs. Now, foundationalism then says that-that we-in knowledge, we have certain beliefs that are sort of self-evident. And these beliefs justify other beliefs. By contrast,

there is another view today call coherentism, that says beliefs are justified by how well they fit with all my other beliefs. And that way, you end up with these webs of beliefs that as long as they're internally coherent and consistent, we call them rea-the beliefs inside them, reasonable belief. Um mit-let me say that foundationalism was the epistemology held by almost every thinker from ancient Greek philosophy up to Emmanuel Kant. Almost every thinker I know of was a foundationalist in epistemology, from the ancient Greeks until Emmanuel Kant.

And I would argue that this ought to tell us something, that we should be careful in rejecting foundationalism, if we don't have to. Finally, and this is the very important point um that the modernists held. It was a very serious mistake. This is a problem with modernity, and it characterizes-uh characterized a number of the modernists, especially the thought of Rene Descartes. And uh this is called the idea theory, the idea theory. What is the idea theory in Descartes? According to Descartes, when I look at that tree over here, and there--we have the tree standing over there--when I look at that tree, I do not see the tree. Instead, there is something between me and the tree that is the direct thing I see, and what is that? It is a sense impression on the back of my retina, called an idea. For Descartes, he just called it an idea. For our purposes, let's call it a sense experience or a sense impression. So according to the idea theory, you and I never see lions, tigers, and bears, oh my. We never see trees. We never taste apples. We never smell a rose.

Instead, when I look at an apple, the thing I see is not the apple, it is the sense image in me of the apple. When I smell a rose, I'm not smelling the rose, I'm smelling the end of my nasal hairs in my nose. When I touch a podium, I am not feeling the podium. I'm feeling the end of my own

nervous system. When I hear an object in the external world, what I'm hearing is a sound in me. This is what was behind that--one of one of the things behind the famous "If a tree falls in the forest and no one's there to hear it, will there be a sound?" The answer is no, because the sound is located inside the conscious listener. Now look what happens for poor Descartes. Descartes now cannot get to the external world. Why? He's trapped behind a concrete wall. And what's the concrete wall made of? His own sense impressions of the world. For Descartes can never get outside of his ideas to see if the tree is the way his idea represents it. All he can do is kind of work inside and fiddle with his idea. Now, he did have a way out of this, but we don't want to go into that this morning. But the point I'm trying to say is, according to the idea theory, I'm trapped behind my sense impressions, and I can't ever get outside of them to see what the world is like.

I remember when I first got the Biola, we had a faculty conference the second year, and there was an art professor that's not here any longer named Dan Callas. He got up and gave a lecture. And Callas made the point that the only way we can get to the world is through our beliefs. Now, note--and that's false, by the way. And notice that what that means for Callas was, that between me and the external world stands something. And what is that something? My beliefs about the world. And the only thing I can really be aware of are my beliefs about the world, not the world itself. Now, the postmodernist today still has a concrete wall, it's just not made of sense impression. What's it made of? Language. Culture. I read now from a text on hermeneutics called Sociolinguistics. "The speaker's," this is a quote, "The speaker's native language sets up a series of categories that serve as a grid through which he perceives the external world."

Notice now, according to the sociolinguistics text, whatever is out there is out there, but I'm stuck behind something. What am I stuck behind? My natural language. What does that natural language do? It's a filter. It's a grid. It's a filter that does what? It puts me on one side of it, and the external world on the other side, you understand that? And I can't get outside the filter and contact the external world. The only way I can get--

[Audio cuts out]

J.P. Moreland:

--I take them to be. According to modernity, then, there is one real world, that's metaphysical realism. Truth is a correspondence between my thought and the world. Language can be used to refer to things in the real world. There is epistemological objectivity, that is, there are cross-cultural standards for rationality. They emphasize the highly individualistic view of the self. They had a foundationalist, theory of knowledge, in which case some things are justified that I believe are reasonable to believe, not because they fit in with everything else, and they justify my other beliefs. And the idea theory that was held not by Locke and others, that between me and the external world, there is something behind which I'm trapped. Now, next Tuesday, what I will do is I will give you the post-modernist rendition of this. Interestingly enough, the postmodernist, as I will describe her, rejects almost every tenant of modernity, but the idea theory.

[J.P. Moreland laughs]

J.P. Moreland:

And the postmodernist has-accepts the idea theory and yet places language in the role of ideas. Let's pray. Father, You have told us that we are to be ready to give an answer to everyone who asks us a reason for the hope that is in us. And that is sometimes just a ton of work. But we can't think of anything else we'd rather give our energy to than the greatest cause on Earth. And so we pray that You would not only help us work hard at this, but get better at it as time goes on. For Your glory, and for our good, and the good of those who do not believe, we ask it. Amen. You are dismissed.

[Music plays and cuts out]

[Silence]