Evidence against Pragmatic Encroachment
- We argue that a certain version of pragmatic encroachment, according to which one knows that 'p' only if one's epistemic position with respect to 'p' is practically adequate, has a problematic consequence: one can 'lose' knowledge that 'p' by getting evidence 'for p', and conversely, one can 'gain' knowledge that 'p' by getting evidence 'against p'. We first describe this version of pragmatic encroachment, and then we defend that it has the problematic consequence. Finally, we deal with a worry that the consequence we find problematic is not, in fact, problematic.
Knowledge, Theory of
Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition
Pickavance, Timothy H., "Evidence against Pragmatic Encroachment" (2015). Faculty Articles & Research. 271.