Title

Evidence against Pragmatic Encroachment

Publication Date

12-2015

Abstract

We argue that a certain version of pragmatic encroachment, according to which one knows that 'p' only if one's epistemic position with respect to 'p' is practically adequate, has a problematic consequence: one can 'lose' knowledge that 'p' by getting evidence 'for p', and conversely, one can 'gain' knowledge that 'p' by getting evidence 'against p'. We first describe this version of pragmatic encroachment, and then we defend that it has the problematic consequence. Finally, we deal with a worry that the consequence we find problematic is not, in fact, problematic.

Keywords

Knowledge, Theory of

Publication Title

Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition

Volume

172

Issue

12

First Page

3135

Last Page

3143

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