Title

Knowledge Argument Revisited

School/Department

Talbot School of Theology

Publication Date

6-2003

Abstract

The literature on the Knowledge Argument exhibits considerable confusion about the precise nature of the argument. I contend that a clarification of the essence of self-presenting properties provides an explanation of this confusion such that the confusion itself is evidence for dualism. I also claim that Mary gains six different sorts of knowledge after gaining sight, and I show how this claim provides a response to a physicalist undercutting defeater for the Knowledge Argument. I try to show that this defeater is inadequate due to its failure to capture the epistemic richness of what happens to Mary. Finally, I indicate how my enriched version of the Knowledge Argument provides grounds for rejecting those varieties of physicalism that eschew a depiction of phenomenal properties as intrinsic attributes a subject exemplifies in favor of a view that treats them as functional roles a subject realizes.

Keywords

Knowledge argument;

Publication Title

International philosophical quarterly: IPQ

Volume

43

Issue

2

First Page

219

Last Page

228

DOI of Published Version

10.5840/ipq20034324

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