Title

Theories of individuation: A reconsideration of bare particulars

School/Department

Talbot School of Theology

Publication Date

1998

Abstract

The metaphysical problem of individuation requires an answer
to two different but intimately related questions: 1) How are we to characterize
individuality ontologically? To what ontological category or logical type
does individuality belong? 2) What sort of distinction is there between the
individuality and nature of an individual, e.g., a real distinction, a modal
distinction, a distinction of reason, or some other distinction My purpose
in this article is to clarify a bare particular account of individuation and
respond to objections that have been raised against bare particulars
as individuators.

Keywords

INDIVIDUATION (Philosophy)

Publication Title

Pacific Philosophical Quarterly

Volume

79

Issue

3

First Page

251

Last Page

263

DOI of Published Version

10.1111/1468-0114.00061

Creative Commons License

Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 License.

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