Title

Exemplification and Constituent Realism: A Clarification and Modest Defense

Publication Date

6-2013

Abstract

In this article I present and (modestly) defend a hybrid position which we may call a Platonist constituent ontology. More specifically, I present a version of exemplification which entails (1) a certain form of Platonism, (2) a constituent ontology of ordinary objects, (3) a view of exemplification as a “tiedto” nexus, and (4) a view of properties as abstract objects that are non-spatially “in” ordinary objects. I clarify two sets of preliminary issues, present my hybrid analysis of exemplification, raise and seek to undercut an argument against my constituent realism, and surface some of the costs and benefits relevant to assessing the relative merits of relational versus constituent realism.

Keywords

Ontology; Realism

Publication Title

Axiomathes

Volume

23

Issue

2

First Page

247

Last Page

259

DOI of Published Version

10.1007/s10516-011-9148-x

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