Title

Erik Wielenberg’s Metaphysics of Morals

School/Department

Talbot School of Theology

Publication Date

2018

Abstract

Focusing on Erik Wielenberg’s metaphysic of morals, I argue that his moral Platonism is, given the presumption against the existence of abstract objects, unmotivated. Moreover, Godless Normative Realism is implausible in light of the mysterious causal relations said to obtain between concrete objects and moral abstracta. His appeals to theism in order to motivate such causal connections is nugatory. If Wielenberg walks back his moral Platonism, then his metaphysics of morals collapses and Godless Normative Realism becomes explanatorily vacuous.

Keywords

Conduct of life; Platonists

Publication Title

Philosophia Christi

Volume

20

Issue

2

First Page

333

Last Page

338

DOI of Published Version

10.5840/pc201820235

Link to Full Text

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