Erik Wielenberg’s Metaphysics of Morals
Talbot School of Theology
Focusing on Erik Wielenberg’s metaphysic of morals, I argue that his moral Platonism is, given the presumption against the existence of abstract objects, unmotivated. Moreover, Godless Normative Realism is implausible in light of the mysterious causal relations said to obtain between concrete objects and moral abstracta. His appeals to theism in order to motivate such causal connections is nugatory. If Wielenberg walks back his moral Platonism, then his metaphysics of morals collapses and Godless Normative Realism becomes explanatorily vacuous.
Conduct of life; Platonists
DOI of Published Version
Craig, William Lane, "Erik Wielenberg’s Metaphysics of Morals" (2018). Faculty Articles & Research. 519.