Title

Craig, Anti-Platonism, and Objective Morality

School/Department

Talbot School of Theology

Publication Date

2017

Abstract

Though William Lane Craig believes his anti-Platonism is compatible with objective, Christian morality, I argue that it is not. First, I survey the main contours of his nominalism. Second, I discuss how he sees those points in relation to objective, Christian morality. Then, I argue that his view cannot sustain the qualitative aspects of moral virtues or principles, or even human beings. Moreover, Craig’s view loses any connection between those morals and humans, thereby doing great violence to objective, Christian morals. Finally, I sketch two advantages of a Platonic realism in regards to Christian morals.

Keywords

Ethics; Platonists

Publication Title

Philosophia Christi

Volume

19

Issue

2

First Page

331

Last Page

343

DOI of Published Version

10.5840/pc201719227

Link to Full Text

Share

COinS